Introduction
One of the historical phenomena in the beginning of Reformation Order 1 was the reappearance of Islamic groups and parties which demanded the implementation of .ryari'ah (Islamic law) in Indonesia through constitutional mechanism. This started during the special session of People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in 1999 and annual session in 2000 and 2002. In the parliament, some Islamic parties such as United Development Party (PPP) and Crescent Star Party (PBB) (both are Islamic parties) pronounced the demand. Through parliamentary mechanism they tried to amend the 1945 Constitution by proposing the seven words to be reinserted in the preamble of 1945 Constitution which will guarantee Indonesian Muslims to practice the entire of .ryari'ah.
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The attempt also received support from some trans:-Islamic movements which had operated underground during Suharto era such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Islamic Brotherhood) including some relatively new Muslim organizations such as The Council of Indonesian Jihadist (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), Jihad Paramilitary (Laskar Jihad) and Islamic Defender Front (FPI) which progressively appeared and attempted to color the open political atmosphere. In this context, those organizations functioned as pressure groups outsides the parliament and campaigners of the importance of .ry ari'ah by employing various methods of da'wah (Islamic proselytization). Although the struggle of ALQ,\L,\l\, [ Islamic parties to reenter the "seven words" failed due to the lack of support from parliament members, the discourse of the implementation of [Jan-'ah Islam continued echoing at the local levels coinciding with the implementation of decentralization policy.
Trying to imitate Acah province which legally implements the formal !Jari'ah, 3 some provinces such as Banten, South Sulawesi, West Sumatra, West Nusa Tenggara and some municipalities such as Bulukumba, Cianjur, Tasikmalaya, and Pamekasan, which have strong connection to Islamic tradition and history, also stipulated the central government to implement !)ati'ah in the regions by proposing special autonomy policy in order to enable Muslims in those regions to practice {Yari'ah. The attempt however also failed not only due to the lack of support in the local parliament but also because the !Yan-'ah implementation proponents have to face the local obstacles such as local government, local parliament, and local Muslims who in fact still have limited understanding about !Jari'ah itself. Nevertheless, numbers of local regulations which contain some Islamic values gradually appeared in some provinces, districts, and municipalities denoting that the struggle of the [Jari'ah implementation's proponent would reach the more local level arena of debate and tension.
This study is dedicated to portray the discourse of the implementation of !Jari'ah in Banten province, a province in the westernmost of Java which was established in 2000 and analyze the roles of the council of' ulamd' Indonesia of Banten province in guiding the discourse. In addition, unlike several studies that dealt with the discourse of implementation of Islamic law with strong emphasize on the roles of Islamic movement organizations mostly categorized as radical organizations,4 I prefer to deal with the role of the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia of Banten province in managing the discourse of the implementation of Islamic law in local area. Using core (center) periphery method to see the phenomena and the dynamic of council of 'ulamd' Indonesia in the local level, I attempt to prove the significant roles of the council of ulama Indonesia of Banten province in guiding and framing the discourse and the movement for not being too radical.
I also elaborate some local regulations and regent's decrees in six municipalities and districts in Banten which are considered to have a relationship upon the discourse of tl1e implementation of [Jati'ah in Banten and are to some extent approved and influenced by the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia of Banten province. The analysis then will try to find the process of power relation between the council of 'u!amd' Indonesia of Banten province toward central council of 'ulamd' Indonesia, the council of 'u!amd' Indonesia of Banten toward local government and local parliament and the council of 'u!amd' of Banten toward Islamic movements in Banten toward the discourse of the implementation of ryari'ah in Banten province. I would argue that the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia of Banten plays as a mediator, restrainer and controller among four interests namely central MUI, local government and parliament, and local Islamic movements.
The paper then will try to answer the following questions namely what is the attitude of the council of 'u!amd' Indonesia Banten province toward the implementation of ryari'ah in Banten province? And how does the roles of the council of 'u!amd' Indonesia Banten upon the discourse? In the frame of Khadim a!-Ummah (the attendant of the Muslim society) indeed the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia of Banten stands its roles in this issue.
Analytical Framework
In this paper entitled "Mediating the Four Interests: The Study of the Council of 'U!amd' Indonesia of Banten Province's roles on the Discourse of the Implementation of ryari'ah in Banten", there at least four conceptual terms that require further clarifications namely: center-periphery, the council of 'u!amd' Indonesia (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI), the ryari'ah and Banten. I want to show how the discourse of the implementation of ryari'ah in Indonesia is not only pronounced in the central level but also in the provincial level which is surprisingly still echoing although some years since the beginning of the debate in the central level have been passed through.
Centre-Periphery Theory
According to Burke, the term "centre" is not a new terminology since the process of centralization is a traditional object of (historical, social, and anthropological) studies.
5 In Burke's view moreover, the terminology of "centre" is problematic since it leads ambiguity in terms that it can be defined in two metaphors namely in geographical sense meaning that a specific area becomes the center and in the sense of politics-economy accumulation.
6 Both notions however cannot be separated and therefore complementary.
Moreover, both are meaningful to see how the accumulation of power, economy, or even a discourse in one central locus of study finally breaks down and spreads up.
Criticizing the concept of the centre proposed by Edward Shill which puts strong emphasis on the role of the center and at the same time was inadequate in paying attention to the periphery, Burke simply defined periphery as the "non-center" and support Castelnuovo's argument that "the periphery is only present as an area of shadow which serves to bring out the radiance of the metropolis".
7 In addition, the centre has shifted in terms that what is previously known as centre or possessed by the centre is not centre in both senses anymore. On the flip side, the periphery of the previous center could be the new centre which is the case of this paper. In this regards, it is important also to consider Bulliet's term of "view the edge". In his view, each locality has its own micro history of Islam which produced fragmented stories that cannot be seen as a whole story.
8 Moreover, he perceived that the aspects of Islam such as the ryari'ah and the 'ulamti' have been elaborated after the death of the prophet. In addition, the historical phase enables Muslims in many localities nominate their own institution to interpret Islam and ryari'ah. 9 In Indonesian case, the discourse of the implementation of ryari'ah was also related to the absence of a single religious institution which could interpret Islam to a diverse and fragmented society.
Furthermore, the central-periphery concept would be very useful to understand the current situation in Indonesia especially after the 32 years New Order hegemonic authoritarian regime which operated centralistic policy. During the ruling of the New Order regime, the accumulation of power, politic, economical, and developmental policy were mainly centered in Jakarta (the capital of Indonesia) and institutions which the New Order created. In the context of studying the council of 'ulamti' Indonesia of Banten province, the central-periphery concept is also meaningful to see whether the pattern of centralistic organization form is still operated or it follows the wind of change in terms that the local council of 'ulamti's in thirty three provinces in Indonesia and hundreds of districts and municipalities have their own characteristic, agenda and history. 10 As stated in its guidelines, the council was functioned as the mediator between state and 'u!amd' as well as the interpreter between the state and the ummah (Indonesian Muslims).
11 The organization hierarchy is not only in the central but also in the three lower levels alternately provincial, district or municipality and sub district levels.
The institution also produces fatwas mainly to guide the government regarding Muslims religious matters and becomes one of religious authority institutions in Indonesia. Practicing authoritarian system and centralistic policy, the regime wanted the 'ulamd's to participate, contribute, and accelerate the development of the country by creating synergy with the central government.
12 This however brought the impact to the fact that most of the fatwa products of national board of council 'u!amd' of Indonesia before the fall of Suharto era were mostly influenced by the centraf govemment�s interest.
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After the fall of Suharto in 1998 however, the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia has shifted their attitude toward the ummah by coining the slogan "Khadim a!-Ummah': The council then wants to preserve the ummah from any problems which will destroy the belief of the ummah. In this paper, the council of 'u!amd' is defined in both perspectives; in the central level and provincial level in which 'ulamd's form different background of Muslim modern or traditional organizations and expertise are gathered under the organization of the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia.
The Syari'ah In Indonesia
The definition of ryari'ah is of course not uniform which has resulted in tension among the proponents and the repellents. There are at least three different ideas in understanding .ryari'ah in Indonesian context. The first group was the proponent of scriptural According to those organizations and political parties, .ryari'ah is defined as the unity of the rules of God which are not only related to tauhid (God Oneness),fiqh (understanding), and 'ibaddh (submission) but also the entire rule of God which should be practiced in every aspects of state such as politics, economy, social, military, culture including some criminal punishments such as stoning to death, flagellating, and cutting the theft's hand. The proponents of .ryari'ah implementation concern to this kind of .ryari' ah while according to the opposing club, they neglect to the fact that there are some regulations which explicitly relate to Islamic teachings which have been well established as part of Indonesian constitution such as laws on zakdh (alms giving), pilgrimage, heritance, and marriage produced by central government to represent the important of Islam and Indonesian Muslims in Indonesia. For those groups the .ryari'ah should be formalized without leaving any sphere for debate. Insisting this understanding, the group tended to support Indonesia to become Islamic state. The first group however is not the religious view mainstreams in Indonesia but could increase the number of followers from time to time.
The second club is categorized as substantialist-moderate Muslim organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which represents modernist and traditionalist Muslim organizations in Indonesia. Both have significant followers among Indonesian Muslims. For the two organizations, .ryari'ah should not be formalized and therefore it is no necessary to establish Islamic state as long as the state could accommodate Islamic values and teachings. In addition to prevent the ideology of the former club, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama categorized the first clubs as dangerous Islamic movements that will destroy the unity of Indonesia as a nation-state. The third group was the secular-nationalist organizations, which did not support any religious interests to be accommodated in the state affairs. The proponent of this group however is the bi gg est in the parliament. The two bi gg est parties in Indonesia such as Golkar Party and Indonesia Democratic Party of Stru gg le (PDIP) are the proponents of secular-state. Meanwhile, human's right activists and several non-government organizations including the liberal Islamic Network GIL) are among the main supporters for the third group.
Banten Province
After the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, the numbers of progressive policies toward democracy, human rights and good governance were implemented in Indonesia. One of the policies was the regional autonomy regulation produced by the central government to pronounce the so-called decentralization policy as the consequence of the wind of change blown by the reformed political administration. The policy No. 22/1999 on regional autonomy and No.25/1999 on financial balance between central government and local government for example aimed to empower local governments after being politically manipulated during the former regime. It was then responded by the local elites demanding to the establishment of new provinces and municipalities based on ethno-religious-historical motives and the common objective, which was to create the more · 15
prosperous society. In this paper, Banten province is defined as a province in the westernmost of Java, which separated from West Java Province and was established based on Law No. 23/2000 released on 4 October 2000. The province is inhabited by a majority of Bantenese ethnic group who employs two different languages in their daily activity; Sundanese-Banten used in the Southern Banten and Javanese-Banten language used mostly in the Northern of Banten. In the beginning of its establishment, Banten province consists of four districts namely Serang, Lebak, Tangerang, and Pandeglang and two municipalities namely Tangerang and Cilegon. In 2006, Serang municipality was officially established as the capital of Banten province. Meanwhile South Tangerang municipality was established in 2008. Accordingly Ban ten province until 2010 consists of four districts and four municipalities.
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The Pancasila and Islamization in Indonesia
Pancasila is the Indonesian state ideology which consists of five principles namely a belief in one supreme being (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa), a just and civilized humanitarianism (Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab), the unity of Indonesia (Persatuan Indonesia), people governed by wise policies from a process of consultation and consensus (Keraryatan yang Dipimpin o/eh Hikmat Keb i jaksanaan dalam Permusyaratan/ penvaki/an), and the social justice for all of Indonesian people (Keadi/an Sosia/ bagi Se/uruh Rakyat Indonesia). 16 Attempting to find the common ground for the sake of national identity and the unity of Indonesia, Sukarno in 1945 coined and popularized the pancasila that could be accepted by all elements of Indonesia and at the same time challenging religion-based ideology and Communism to be the ideology of the new states.
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Standing among various ideologies after a heated and intense debate, pancasila in fact gave a freedom for Indonesian to practice their own religion as stated in the first principles without considering one religion above other religions. By implementing the third principle of pancasila moreover, hundreds of tribes and languages were united while promoting the Indonesian nationalism. The five principles of pancasila moreover, according to Sukarno, were dug from Indonesian value and culture that guided the archipelago to be a nation.
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The process of building Indonesia as a nation is also related to Anderson's term of "imagined communities" that grew up replacing the religious communities and dynastic realm. 19 The name of Indonesia was in fact relatively a new word which appeared in the beginning of twentieth century. Hundreds years before the invention of "Indonesia", islands in the archipelago were ruled by many religious dynasties and city-state kingdoms spread from the Northern part of Sumatra to Java and Ambon. Between 1850 and 1910 the Dutch colonial government conquered most of the kingdoms and sultanates. Through certain social and political process, the Indonesian national consciousness explicitly emerged in 1928 when youth organizations from diverse islands in archipelago gathered and proclaimed the unity of motherland, nationality, and language.
According to Burke however, during the construction of a community, it cannot be assumed that a community has become the final society with a solid solidarity included but the process of construction and reconstruction of a community would color the 21 This can be proved during the formation of Indonesian Constitution in which Islam and Nationalist-secular ideological debate were involved in the long and heated discussion in the parliament.
The discourse of the implementation of .ryari'ah in Indonesia after the fall of New Order regime can be seen as the continuation of the debate. At the same time, the reemergence of .ryari'ah discourse would examine the role of pancasila as the national ideology that has glued together and united thousands of islands and hundreds of tribes under the banner of Indonesia as the nation-states since the birth of Indonesia. The main concern of nationalist proponents is when .ryari'ah is imposed as the national foundation, Islam, Muslims and its law would slowly replace the Pancasila which has become the spirit of Indonesia and would finally break the unitary Republic of Indonesia. It is reasonable however since in the view of the proponents of ryari'ah implementation pancasila is seen as human-created ideology which is not resulted from the revelations. Furthermore, Islam according to the proponents of .ryari'ah implementation is a comprehensive religion which provides the entire of law and regulation for human being. Basing their argument on historical phases of the prophethood and the four rightly-guided Caliphs, the proponent of .ryari'ah believe that Islam. can function as tl1e religion and as the political institution as well.
The Genesis of the Discourse: Syari'ah in Banten Sultanate
After the establishment of Banten province in 2000, Bantenese elements tried to find their unique identity, which had been buried by two political layers before its establishment. The first layer was the New Order policy which pronounced the national identity under the slogan of . Bhineka Tun gg al Ika (unity in diversity), securing the sacredness of Pancasila (the five principles) by imposing policy which obliged all political parties and mass organizations to utilize Pancasila as the solely foundation of the organizations in Indonesia and the campai gn of using Bahasa Indonesia as national language.
22 Enunciating the important of the unity however, the central government tended to i gn ore the unique character of hundred of tribes and local languages inhabited and used in different islands. In Banten province case, the second political layer employed was the domination of Sundanese-Priangan cultures of West Java on Bantenese culture. This could be observed for example in the local language subject studied in the elementary and junior high schools which emphasize the Sundanese-Priangan language which was considered more polite and soft compared to Sundanese-Banten which was considered more rude and impolite while totally neglected the Javanese-Banten language to be studied in elementary schools. This situation is an obvious sort of centralization of language explained by Burke as during the political centralization of Britain and France, English and France defused and on the other hand the local languages were marginalized.
23 Not to mention, official appointments in almost every important bureaucratic position in Banten were monopolized by officials from West Java appointed either by central or the West Java government. 24 The two layers then strengthened the spirit of Bantenese ethnicity to separate form West Java province.
In the search of Bantenese identity and symbol furthermore, the discourse of implementation of .ryari'ah in Banten was emerged and articulated by elements of Bantenese society. Several seminars and workshops were held by trans-national Islamic movements in the local level as well as Bantenese elements which supported the implementation of .ryari'ah in Banten. 25 One of the main concerns of these elements was to bring back the glorious development and soverei gn ty of Banten province. The proponents of the implementation of .rya,f'ah in Banten believed that Banten province should reflect the sultanate era's glory and magnificence in which Islam became the sole basis of the sultanate.
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During the glory of Banten sultanate for example, the area of Banten's territory did not only reach Eastern areas (such as Batavia and Priangan) from its core region in the Northern of Banten but also reach Lampung and Southern part of Sumatra. 27 The port of Banten sultanate moreover was also known as one of the busiest ports in the archipelago opening the opportunity to cooperate with forei gn countries such as China, Britain, Denmark, Netherlands and many European countries. Possessing the development in economical and political aspect also enabled the sultanate to enhance Banten sultanate to be the core of Islamic civilization. In the peak of its glory, Banten sultanate Related to the evidence upon the implementation of syari'ah law during the sultanate's law administration moreover, the sultan possessed a Qddi's who were transferred from forei gn countries and gave religious advice to the Sultans. In Ban ten sultanate, a Qddi court functioned as a law institution that would decide the punishment for the criminals based upon the .ryari'ah. 29 This has strengthened the determination of proponents of syari'ah implementation,, making them believe that during the sultanate, some Islamic laws had been imposed in Banten sultanate, which should be followed by Bantenese after becoming the new provmce.
The second historical argument was that based on the Dutch Colonial reports, Banten was a home of the second most fanatical Muslim in the archipelago after Aceh.
30 Meanwhile, Harry Benda indicated that there are three areas in the archipelago which have stronger Islamic tradition and practices and have less Hinduism's influences namely Aceh, Banten, and Minangkabau. 31 The notion however needs further examination especially after several historical processes which took years that might enable a society to experience different historical, social, political, and cultural changes.
It is probably true when one observes the statistical data related to Islam Not to mention there are more than two thousands pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools) throughout Banten province.
33 However, numbers in statistic data does not guarantee Muslims in Banten understand neither the syan-'ah which campai gn ed by the syan-'ah implementation proponents nor the Islamic glory during the sultanate era. This fact can be observed in the case of Islamic party voters in Banten province during 1999 Banten province during , 2004 Banten province during , and 2009 general elections that will be discussed later. Indeed, the number of legislative members from Islamic parties, which supported the implementation of syari'ah in Banten is very pivotal instrument in dealing with this issue. On 15 to 17 June 2001, the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia of Banten province carried out the training of preachers. After the training held, some recommendations were produced and one of which was to support the implementation of ryari'ah in Banten and counted on Bantenese society, mass organizations, religious and political institutions to participate actively in the process and the attempt to implement it. 36 This was the first attempt of the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia of Banten province involved in the discourse of the identity of Banten province which put strong emphasize on ryari'ah Islam as the main issue.
The attempt cannot be separated by internal and external political situations and therefore cannot stand alone. There are four internal political situations taking place in this period. The first internal political situation was the struggle of Muslim organizations and Islamic political party in the parliament to reinsert the seven words into the constitution. The second was implementation of ryari'ah in Aceh which influenced Muslims in Banten to imitate Aceh. The third was the religious conflict in Ambon in 1999 and 2000 which indirectly bolstered the enthusiasm to implement ryari'ah. The other factor was the enthusiasm of some provinces and municipalities to prosecute the special autonomy similar to Aceh. Whereas the external factor such as the global politics concerning Muslim in Palestine for example was also significant to trigger the issue of ryari'ah implementation. From this point, it is obvious that the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia acted as one of the chain and actor of the discourse on the implementation of ryari' ah in Banten. 37 The main concern of the committee was to prepare for the implementation of syari'ah in Banten and socialize the syari'ah among Bantenese society.
The first attempt of this big coalition of Muslims mass organizations in Banten was to examine its influence in the discussion of the motto of Banten province during the Banten province parliamentary meeting in 2002. The Council of 'ulamd' Indonesia of Banten and P3SIB proposed "Banten Darussalam" for the motto of the new province. Clearly, the logo was aimed at indicating Islam as the basis of Bantenese society and did imitate Aceh province's label of "Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam".
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However, the attempt was seen by secular-nationalist parties, which were majority in the Banten province parliament as the effort to implement syari'ah in Banten. By proposing the logo of "Banten Darussalam", it was assumed by the nationalist parties that Bantenese Muslim elements in the council of' ulamd' Indonesia of Ban ten and the P3SIB indirectly started a small step as the beginning to propose a special autonomy administration similar to that in Aceh. Diplomatically, the chief of the council of' ulamd' Indonesia of Ban ten province stated that the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia of Banten proposed the motto "Banten Darussalam" since the districts and municipalities in Banten have also Islamic mottos such as Serang districts with the motto "Serang Bertakwa" (Serang is pious), Tangerang's motto is "Tangerang Beriman" (Tangerang is faithful), Lebak's motto is "Lebak Bertauhid" (Lebak believes the oneness of God), and Pandeglang's motto was "Pandeglang Berkah" (Pandeglang was blessed).
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In fact, the attempt to propose the motto of "Banten Darussalam" was not successful due to the lack of supports among parliamentary members. This was obvious since the number of parliamentary members of Islamic parties, which supported the motto was not significant in influencing the result. The following table will show the mapping of parliament members in 2002: Table 1 The 
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If we calculate the potential supporters in the parliament of Banten province, it is clear that the number of the parliament members who would support the motto come only from Islamic-basis parties such as Nahdlatul Ummat party (1 seat), Masyumi Party (1 seat), Sarekat Islam Party (1 seat), the Crescent Star Party (1 seat), the Justice Party (2 seats), and the United Development Party (12 seats) which were overall only 18 seats or only 24% of parliament seat. Therefore the proposal of "Banten Darussalam" as the motto of Banten province was failed.
Yet, the parliament of Banten province agreed to release "Iman cl an Taqwa" (faith and piety) as the motto of Banten province. Furthermore, after the first attempt of proposing the "Banten Darussalam in the parliament, Bantenese elements incorporated in P3SIB delivered the socialization of the discourse of implementation of [Jari' ah and the attempt to implement it to the council of 'u/amd' Indonesia of Banten province.
41 It means the "ball" of the discourse is in the hand of the council of' u/amd' Indonesia of Ban ten.
The Council of 'Ulama' Indonesia of Banten and Local Regulations
Along with the discourse of the implementation of !Jari'ah since the beginning of the establishment of Banten province and after the motto "Iman and Taqwa" was introduced, numbers of local regulation (Peraturan Daerah) were produced by the six local governments in Banten province and agreed by local parliaments. Although Islamic movements such as Hizb Tahrir argued that those local regulations did not entirely represent the !Jan-'ah, the council of 'ulamd' Banten as stated by one of the chiefs, suggested that the implementation of the !J an-' ah should begin by the implementation of local regulations which have strong connection to Islamic values.
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The forms of [Jari'ah-oriented local regulations are varied ranging from official local regulations released after plenary session (Sidan g Paripurna) agreed by all parliament members and local major to the decree, instruction, and circular letters released by the local major. The following table will show some of [Jari'ah-oriented local regulations in districts and municipalities of Banten province. As stated in the punishment column, there is no single punishment which is based or considered on the Quran, the Sunnah (prophet tradition) or the consensus of 'ulamd'. In this regards, it is obvious if in the view of Islamic movement such as Hizbut Tahrir those local regulations are not related to Islam. On the other hand, the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia of Banten province tends to use the local parliament as the main gate to realize the implementation of !Jari'ah in Banten. In the view of the council of 'ulamd' Indonesia of Banten province moreover, the local regulations showed a significant development on the discourse of the implementation of !)'ari'ah in Banten province. By implementing the local regulations tn every district and municipalities in Banten, the awareness of Bantenes society on the need of the presence of !)'ari'ah would be increased gradually.
The result of the two last elections in Banten province however showed that the voters tended to support non Islamic parties The discourse of the implementation of ryari'ah in Banten will continue echoing although it would have different intensity and frequency. The major actor of the discourse besides Islamic Parties in the parliament and local and trans-Islamic movements is the council of 'ulamti' Indonesia of Banten. Although after the 2002 onward, the discourse was gradually diminished, in the beginning of 2007 the discourse of the implementation of ryari'ah in Banten was pronounced ottce more during the tablig akbar (public sermon) organized by the council of 'ulamti' Indonesia of Ban ten province.
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The event was the series of activities of the Muslim of Banten Congress (Kongres Umat Islam Banten) in which one of the agenda was the discussion of the implementation of ryari'ah in Banten province. The tablig akbar event, however, was not attended by the Governor of Banten province. This clue might be an important si gn al for the proponents of ryari'ah implementation in Banten that the governor was not too enthusiastic to support the issue. Not to mention, the governor Atut Chosiyah comes from Golkar party, which is a nationalist-secular party.
It is different if it is compared to a few years before. One of the reasons why the movement of the council of 'ulamti' Indonesia of Banten province and other organizations during the year 2001-2002 could move and organize freely was because the first governor of Banten province was from the United Development Party (PPP). Having the same interest with Bantenese elements who demanded the declaration of the importance of �ymi'ah, the first Governor, J oko Munandar, even once stated in one of local mass media that the local 
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As the proponent of the implementation of .ryari'ah through democratic and constitutional approach, the council of 'u/amd' Indonesia of Banten province needs more efforts to convince the local government, local legislative members as well as the ummah and Muslim mass organizations in Banten on the importance of the implementation of [Jari'ah in Banten. 2 The seven words are "with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law". The sentence also known as ''Jakarta Charter" was produced by Indonesian founding fathers as a compensation for Islamic groups who insisted struggling Indonesia to become Islamic state. By inserting the seven words, Muslims in Indonesia were obliged to implement Islamic law. The agreement however was lasted in a very short period since the seven words were finally deleted from the draft of Indonesian's constitution. The proponent of secular state argued that if the seven words were inserted in the constitution, some regions in Eastern Indonesia would be separated from Indonesia. The attempts to reinsert the seven words into 
